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KANT, SOEMMERRING AND THE IMPORTANCE OF 
THE SENSE OF HEARING 
ABSTRACT: The following essay takes its cue from the importance that Soemmerring 
attributes to the sense of hearing in the Über das Organ der Seele (1796), a text published 
with a comment by Kant. First, I point out that the idea of a primacy of the sense of 
hearing is shared by Soemmerring with Heinse, a famous writer of the time (and by 
Heinse with Herder). Second, I compare these ideas with Kant’s growing interest for the 
close connection between the sense of hearing, language and thought, giving due attention 
to his theses on deafness. Finally, I propose the hypothesis that not a late and tacit 
agreement with Herder, but Soemmerring’s statement that hearing is the most important 
of our senses, might be the reason for the strengthening of Kant’s conviction that 
“thinking is speaking and the latter is hearing”, testified by the Opus Postumum. 
SOMMARIO: Il seguente saggio prende spunto dall'importanza che Soemmerring 
attribuisce al senso dell’udito in Über das Organ der Seele (1796), un testo che contiene in 
appendice un commento di Kant. In primo luogo, si fa notare che le idee circa il primato 
del senso dell'udito sono condivise da Soemmerring con Heinse, un famoso scrittore del 
tempo (e sono condivise da Heinse con Herder). In secondo luogo, si pongono a paragone 
queste idee con il crescente interesse di Kant per la stretta connessione fra il senso 
dell’udito, il linguaggio e il pensiero, dando la dovuta attenzione alle sue tesi sulla sordità. 
Infine, si propone l’ipotesi che non un tardo e tacito accordo con Herder, ma 
l'affermazione di Soemmerring che l'udito è il più importante dei nostri sensi sia la ragione 
del rafforzamento della convinzione di Kant che “pensare è parlare e quest’ultimo è un 
udire”, testimoniato nell’Opus Postumum.  
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In 1795 Samuel Thomas Soemmerring (1755-1830)1 – the author of a 
monumental work in six volumes on the construction of the human body2 
– asked Kant to comment on an essay he was going to publish with the title 
Über das Organ der Seele, in which he intended to locate the ‘seat of the 
soul’ in the ventricular fluids of the brain. 3 
1. Asking Kant for a philosophical comment 
It is strange that Soemmerring should ask Kant for a comment. In his essay 
Soemmerring mentions Ernst Platner, whose work he acknowledges not 
only as one of his sources but even as one of the foundations of his main 
idea.4 Kant had a low opinion of Platner’s program of a “physiological 
anthropology”, as exposed in the Neue Anthropologie für Ärzte und 
Weltweise.5 In a letter to Herz, written around 1773, Kant refers to a 
review of Platner’s book published by his correspondent but only to 
highlight the novelty of his own plan to make anthropology into a “proper 
academic discipline”, a plan from which, he says, the “eternally futile 
inquiries as to the manner in which bodily organs are connected with 
thought I omit entirely”.6  
In 1791 this kind of criticism had been publicly renewed by Ludwig 
Heinrich Jakob, one of Kant’s acknowledged followers. In a book, 
containing a chapter entitled “Von der Gemeinschaft der Seele und des 
Körpers”, Jakob maintains:  
                                                          
1 The name of this author is spelled in a variety of ways: Sömmerring, Sömerring, 
Soemmering. The choice of the spelling Soemmerring is in agreement with AA 12, p. 30, 
as well as with recent scholarship. Nonetheless, other spellings have been maintained, 
where necessary, for philological reasons. 
2 S. T. Sömmerring, Vom Baue des menschlichen Körpers, 6 vols, Frankfurt, 
Varrentrapp & Wenner, 1791-1796. 
3 Id., Über das Organ der Seele, Königsberg, Nicolovius, 1796. 
4 Ibid., § 62, p. 67, quotes extensively, and in total agreement, a text by Platner that 
he calls Quaestiones Physiologicae, but whose exact title is E. Platner, Quaestionum 
physiologicarum libri duo: quorum altero generalis altero particularis physiologicae potiora 
capita illustrantur; praecedit prooemium tripartitum de constituenda physiologiae disciplinae, 
Lipsiae, Crusius, 1794, Liber I, § 1, p. 57. 
5 E. Platner, Neue Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise, Leipzig, Dyck, 1772.  
6 Kant’s letter to Markus Herz, AA 10, p. 145, in I. Kant, Correspondence, trans. and 
ed. by A. Zweig, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. See T. Sturm, Kant und 
die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Münster, Mentis, 2009, p. 265 (see also the whole 
chapter on “The Critique of Physiological Anthropology”).  
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Looking for the physical point of this community, i.e., wanting to search for the seat 
of the soul, means to occupy oneself with a totally useless work. For a place is a 
relation in space and the latter can therefore pertain only a material substance. But, 
since the soul is not an object of the outer sense (§ 12), the soul is no material 
substance; thus it follows that no place can be attributed to it, and the question of 
the seat of the soul is completely senseless. The soul is everywhere she acts and 
produces changes. In this sense, therefore, the body, with which she is in immediate 
community, is her place, because she acts in and through it.  
Den physischen Punkt dieser Gemeinschaft suchen, d.h. den Sitz der Seele bestimmen zu 
wollen, heiβt sich mit einer ganz vergeblichen Arbeit abgeben. Denn ein Ort ist ein 
Verhältniβ im Raume, und dieser kann daher nur einer materiellen Substanz 
zukommen. Da aber die Seele gar kein Gegenstand des äussern Sinnes (§. 12) mithin auch 
keine materielle Substanz ist; so folgt, daβ ihr gar kein Ort beigelegt werden kann; und 
daβ die Frage über den Sitz der Seele völlig sinnlos ist. Die Seele ist allenthalben, wo sie 
wirkt und Veränderungen hervorbringt. In diesem Sinne ist also der Körper, mit dem sie 
in unmittelbarer Gemeinschaft steht, ihr Ort, weil sie in und durch denselben wirkt.7 
In 1795, the same year Soemmerring asked Kant to comment on his essay 
so indebted to Platner, the latter published a polemical reply to the 
criticism of the Kantian Jakob.8  
Briefly, no one familiar with the views of Kant and his followers about 
the location of the soul would have asked him to comment on 
Soemmerring’s essay. But no one familiar with these views would have 
imagined that Kant would have accepted to write a comment. 
2. Kant: A comment based on scientific data 
Kant did write a comment but in his own terms.9  
He rejects the very idea that a local presence of the soul should enter 
scientific arguments. Therefore, both his published comment and the 
                                                          
7 L. H. Jakob, Grundriβ der Erfahrungs-Seelenlehre, Halle, Hemmerde-Schwetschke, 
1791, § 44.  
8 See E. Platner, Lehrbuch der Logik und Metaphysik, Leipzig, Schwichertschen 
Verlag, 1795 (this is an Auszug, destined to lectures, of the Philosophische Aphorismen), p. 
15-16: Platner argues that Jakob’s proposal to consider the whole body as the seat of the 
soul, rather than searching for it “in einer einzelnen Stelle des Gehirn”, does not eliminate 
the difficulties raised by Jakob himself concerning the spatial location of the soul. 
9 I. Kant, Über das Organ der Seele, trans. as From Soemmerring's On the organ of the 
soul, in I. Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, ed. by G. Zöller, R. B. Louden, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, AA 12, p. 31-35. Kant’s comment was 
originally printed in Sömmering, Über das Organ der Seele, p. 81-86. 
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manuscripts related to his comment intend to use Soemmerring’s 
anatomical findings to the end of offering a scientific explanation of the 
cooperation of our senses. In particular, Kant tries to give an answer to the 
question of how the ventricular fluid in the brain might be organized, given 
that the merging of our sensations into a single experience must involve 
some sort of ordering principle. But how can a fluid substance be organized 
if, by its very nature, it cannot have a spatial, and even less a mechanical, 
organization? Kant’s interesting suggestion is that this organization might 
occur dynamically, as a sequential ordering of chemical solutions.10 In sum, 
the philosopher Kant chooses to address a scientific question he is 
interested in, and offers a solution in line with his late attraction for the 
new developments of chemistry.11  
Kant’s refusal to solve a philosophical problem by physiological means 
can be better understood if we consider how deeply he reflected on the 
relation between soul and body in a philosophical perspective. It suffices to 
mention here that, in a letter to Herz, he considers this relation as 
concerning two faculties, namely sense and understanding, even resorting 
to a personal interpretation of Leibniz’s pre-established harmony: 
I am quite convinced that Leibniz, in his pre-established harmony (which he, like 
Baumgarten after him, made very general), had in mind not the harmony of two 
different natures, namely, sense and understanding, but that of two faculties 
belonging to the same nature, in which sensibility and understanding harmonize to 
form experiential knowledge.12 
All the same, Kant had a keen interest for medicine, in particular for 
physiology. Was this interest a consequence of his well-documented 
hypochondria?13 Or was his curiosity for craniology a mere consequence of 
having Karl Reusch, a student of Gall, as a frequent dinner guest in his later 
                                                          
10 Kant, From Soemmerring’s On the organ of the soul, AA 12, p. 33-34. 
11 See M. Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences, Cambridge Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1992, p. 264-290. 
12 Kant’s letter to Herz of May 26 1787, in Kant, Correspondence, AA 11, p. 48-55. 
For an estensive treatment of this subject, see M. Capozzi, “L'io e la conoscenza di sé in 
Kant”, in E. Canone (ed.), Per una storia del concetto di mente, vol. II, Firenze, Olschki, 
2007, p. 267-326. 
13 See General Introduction, in Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, p. 3. 
Kant’s constant preoccupation with his health occupies part of his, otherwise 
philosophically important, correspondence with the physician Markus Herz, see A. Zweig, 
“Introduction”, in Kant, Correspondence, p. 18. 
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years?14 The answer to these suggestions is negative. Kant was very much 
attracted by medicine, not only as a cure but also as the study of the 
workings of the body, especially for their relevance in cognitive processes. A 
good example is offered by the importance Kant attributes to the bodily 
sense of hearing, as can be appreciated by returning to Soemmerring’s essay. 
3. The sense of hearing: Soemmerring and Heinse 
In his letter of August 22 1795, where he thanks Kant for writing the 
comment on his essay, Soemmerring draws Kant’s attention to the fact that 
Über das Organ der Seele gives scientific support to a speculative thesis, 
advanced by Heinse, to the effect that hearing is the most important sense:  
Heinse and I were much rejoiced when we found [...] that we had been working, 
without knowing of each other, for the proposition: hearing is the most important 
sense. He had found the proposition out of speculation and I could give him the 
anatomical reason for it. 
Heinse und ich hatten große Freude als wir […] fanden daß wir ohne von einander zu 
wissen für den Satz, das Gehör ist der wichtigste Sinn gearbeitet hatten. Er hatte den Satz 
aus speculation gefunden und ich konnte ihm den anatomischen Grund dafür geben.15 
This statement raises two questions. The first question concerns the reason 
why Soemmerring highlights his interest for the sense of hearing in Über 
das Organ der Seele. The second question concerns the reason why 
Soemmerring considers Heinse’s speculations on hearing to be relevant for 
his anatomical and physiological studies. 
As to the first question, Sommerring has much to say about the sense 
of hearing because his whole investigation begins with an examination of 
the auditory nerves that originate from the labyrinths and end on the walls 
of the fourth ventricle. He notices, first of all, that the vibrations and 
oscillations of the auditory nerves, and the movements that originate from 
them, are different from those of the sight nerves. In the second place, he 
notices that only the ends of the auditory nerves are directly and without 
detours connected to the liquid of the sensorium commune. Therefore, on 
the one hand, only the vibrations of the auditory nerves are proved to lead 
                                                          
14 See S. M. Shell, The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation and 
Community, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 448. 
15 See AA 12, p. 40.  
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to the very center of all sensations, which is the medium uniens of the 
actions of the nerves, and are consequently proved to lead to the true ‘seat’ 
of the soul.16 On the other hand, only by analogy with the auditory nerves 
it is possible to apply the results of these anatomical observations to the 
olfactory and optic nerves.  
As to the second question, the reference made by Soemmerring to 
Wilhelm Heinse (1746-1803) can be explained not so much with their 
personal friendship,17 but with the fact that Heinse was known to be a 
supporter of the doctrine that hearing is the fundamental human sense 
and, as such, is superior to all the other senses, even to sight. It has been 
observed that Herder too had expressed a similar conviction,18 but it has 
also been remarked that Heinse had exposed his views in the Musikalische 
Dialogen, first published posthumously in 1805, but written around 1770, 
so that it is even possible to suppose that the late Herder in Kalligone 
(1800) could have been inspired by Heinse.19  
Soemmerring had long known his friend’s ideas. But something new 
had happened at the time of Über das Organ der Seele: between 1795 and 
1796 Heinse had published his famous novel Hildegard von Hohenthal,20 
                                                          
16 See the accurate description in M. Di Giandomenico, “Kant, Soemmerring e il 
dibattito sulla ‘sede dell’anima’”, in C. Esposito, P. Ponzio, P. Porro, V. Castellano (eds), 
Verum et Certum. Studi di storiografia filosofica in onore di Ada Lamacchia, Bari, Levante 
Editori, 1998, p. 167-193. 
17 See M. Dick, “Der Literat und der Naturforscher. W. Heinse und S. Th. 
Soemmerring”, in S. Th. Soemmerring und die Gelehrten des Goethezeit, ed. by G. Mann 
and F. Dumont, Stuttgart-New York, Fisher, 1985, p. 203-228. See also M. Wenzel, “‘Wir 
beide haben ohne dieß genug Neider!’ Die Freundschaft zwischen Heinse und 
Soemmerring”, in Das Maß des Bacchanten. Wilhelm Heinses Über-Lebenskunst, ed. G. 
Theile, München, Fink, 1998, p. 159-184. 
18 See M. Di Manno, Tra sensi e spirito. La concezione della musica e la 
rappresentazione del musicista nella letteratura tedesca alle soglie del Romanticismo, Firenze, 
Firenze University Press, 2009, p. 44. 
19 See A. Stollberg, Ohr und Auge - Klang und Form: Facetten einer musikästhetischen 
Dichotomie bei Johann Gottfried Herder, Richard Wagner und Franz Schreker, Beihefte 
zum Archiv für Musikwissenschaft, 58, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 2006. See also R. 
Terras, “Wilhelm Heinse’s Musikalische Dialogen”, Goethe Yearbook: Publications of the 
Goethe Society of North America, 6, 1992, p. 181-92. 
20 W. Heinse, Hildegard von Hohenthal, in Id. Hildegard von Hohenthal und 
Musikalische Dialogen, ed. Werner Keil with B. Petersen, Hildesheim, Olms, 2002, p. 7-
376. For literature on Heinse, see M. L. Baeumer, “Zur neuen Heinse-Forschung”, in 
Theile, Das Maß des Bacchanten, p. 13-24. 
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where he argues at length in favor of the superiority of the sense of hearing. 
From this novel Soemmerring quotes the following passage:  
The ear is certainly our most accurate sense, and even tact, which up to now has been 
held for the most infallible, forms itself after it […] On that account those who are 
born deaf are also so much more sad and unhappy than the blind, because they do 
not have the principal sense of the understanding, [the sense] that gets the other 
senses accustomed to accuracy, and so, of all the arts, music gives the soul the 
brightest and freshest enjoyment. 
Das Ohr ist gewiß unser richtigster Sinn; und selbst das Gefühl, welches man bisher für 
den untrüglichsten gehalten hat, bildet sich nach ihm […] Deßwegen sind die 
Taubgebornen auch um so vieles trauriger und unglücklicher, als die Blinden, weil sie den 
Hauptsinn des Verstandes, der die andern zur Richtigkeit gewöhnt, nicht haben; und so 
giebt die Musik unter allen Künsten der Seele den hellsten und frischesten Genuß.21 
Having cited this text, Soemmerring concludes: 
Therefore I believe to be able to give the physical reason for the truth of this new assertion. 
That is, among all the nerves, as I indicated before, there is none that is so immediately, so 
plainly and simply in contact with the humidity of the ventricles, and consequently that also 
stirs the common sensorium so immediately – that is, in other words: the hearing nerve acts 
most accurately and gives the brightest and freshest sensations. 
So glaube ich den physischen Grund für die Wahrheit dieser neuen Behauptung 
angeben zu können Unter allen Nerven nämlich ist keiner, wie ich oben zeigte, der so 
unmittelbar, so nackt und bloß mit der Feuchtigkeit der Hirnhöhlen in Berührung 
steht; folglich auch so unmittelbar das Gemeinsame Sensorium rührt – das ist mit 
andern Worten: Der Hörnerven wirkt am richtigsten, und giebt die hellsten und 
frischsten Empfindungen.22  
It is interesting that, just as Soemmerring declares to have found a 
‘speculative’ support in Heinse, so Heinse declares in Hildegard von 
Hohenthal to have found scientific support in Soemmerring’s still 
unpublished essay on the organ of the soul:  
Sömmerring believes, in his very recent, important, still unpublished writing about 
the sensorium commune, to be able to specify the physical reason for the truth of this 
thesis. “Of all the nerves”, he says, “there is none that is so immediately, so plainly 
and simply in contact with the humidity of the ventricles (in which he seeks the 
organ of the sensorium commune), and consequently that also so immediately stirs 
                                                          
21 Soemmerring, Über das Organ der Seele, § 39, p. 48. 
22 Ibid., p. 49. 
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the common sensorium. For the beginning, or the outermost cerebral-end of this 
nerve is so manifestly and distinctly set out by nature itself that it would be truly 
absurd to want to discover by art still something more regarding the cerebral ends of 
the pair of auditory nerves. 
Sömmering glaubt in seiner neuesten, wichtigen, noch ungedruckten Schrift über das 
Sensorium commune den physischen Grund für die Wahrheit dieser Behauptung 
angeben zu können. „Unter allen Nerven nämlich,“ sagt er, „ist keiner, der so 
unmittelbar, so nackt und bloß mit der Feuchtigkeit der Hirnhöhlen (worin er das 
Organ des Sensorium commune sucht) in Berührung steht; folglich auch so unmittelbar 
das gemeinsame Sensorium rührt. Denn der Anfang, oder das äußerste Hirnende dieses 
Nerven ist so offenbar und deutlich von der Natur selbst dargelegt, daß es wahrlich 
ungereimt sein würde, in Rücksicht der Hirnenden des Hörnervenpaars noch etwas 
mehr durch die Kunst entdecken zu wollen.23 
Given these reciprocal quotations, and the hymn to the ear they contain, it 
is no surprise that the title page of the first edition of Hildegard von 
Hohenthal features the following image: 
 
                                                          
23 Heinse, Hildegard von Hohenthal, p. 47 n.  
Kant, Soemmerring and the Importance of the Sense of Hearing 
 33 
This image is a tribute to Soemmerring because it is the latter’s drawing of 
the ideal (female) ear.24 
Soemmerring reciprocated Heinse’s admiration to the point that he 
honored his memory by of placing “Heinse’s skull in his library next to 
Heinse’s own poetry”.25  
4. Kant and the sense of hearing 
Soemmerring underscores in his letter to Kant the importance of the sense 
of hearing and connects this importance to Heinse’s views. Given the 
emphasis with which he insists on this question in his essay, it is strange 
that he should bring it again to Kant’s attention. Clearly Soemmerring 
must have been surprised that Kant never touched this subject in his 
comment,26 and probably Heinse too would have liked to know Kant’s 
opinion. In fact, a study of his notebooks has shown that, in writing 
Hildegard, he had been comparing the views of Soemmerring on how 
sound affects the body with those of Kant in the third Critique.27  
Was Kant uninterested in hearing?28 This question must be given a 
negative answer because: I) Kant considers language indispensable to 
thinking; II) the importance he accords to language cannot be fully 
appreciated if it is not connected with the importance he accords to the 
sense of hearing. 
As to point I), Kant rejects the traditional view according to which 
‘judgment’ (Urtheil, iudicium) is the mental act and ‘proposition’ (Satz, 
                                                          
24 See Di Manno, Tra sensi e spirito, p. 159. The image is taken from 
http://www.heinse.de/hohenthal.htm 
25 S. Juterczenka, “‘Chamber Moors’ and Court Physicians. On the Convergence of 
Aesthetic Consumption and Racial Anthropology at Eighteenth-Century Courts in 
Germany”, in K. Hock-G. Mackenthun, Entangled Knowledge. Scientific Discourses and 
Cultural Difference, Münster, Waxmann, 2012, p. 172. See also M. Hagner, Des cerveaux 
de génie. Une histoire de la recherche sur les cerveaux d’élite, traduit de l’allemand par O. 
Mannoni, Paris, Éd. de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, 2008. 
26 Kant, From Soemmerring's On the organ of the soul, AA 12, p. 34, just mentions the 
auditory nerves. 
27 See T. Irvine, “Reading, Listening, and Performing in Wilhelm Heinse’s Hildegard 
von Hohenthal (1796)”, The Journal of Musicology, 30, 2013, p. 502-529. 
28 K. Huber, “Herders Begründung der Musikästhetik”, I Teil, Archiv für 




proposition) is a judgment expressed in words.29 For Kant this is nonsense, 
as he states in his polemic with Eberhard30 and in logic lectures:  
when the logici say […] that a proposition is a judgment clothed in words, that means 
nothing, and this definition is worth nothing at all. For how will they be able to 
think judgments without words?31 
M. Forster maintains that this is one of the texts, written in 1790 and after, 
that testifies of Kant’s late conversion to Herder’s point of view as concerns 
the importance of language.32 In my opinion there are strong philological 
reasons that impose to date this text in the early 1780s.33 But, even if 
Forster were right, his thesis does not hold if we consider that the Pölitz 
Logic, dated at around the time of the first edition of the Critique of pure 
reason, contains the following statements: 
Logicians define a proposition per Judicium verbis prolatum, which is false, however, 
we would not judge at all, if we had no words. 
Die Logiker definiren einen Saz per Judicium verbis prolatum, welches aber falsch ist, 
wir würden gar nicht urteilen, wenn wir keine Wörter hätten.34 
Ratiocinium formale est syllogismus; one says otherwise verbis expressum, this is false, 
without words one cannot think at all. 
Ratiocinium formale est Syllogismus; man sagt sonst verbis expreßum, das ist falsch, 
ohne die Worte kann man gar nicht denken.35 
 
                                                          
29 See, e.g., G. F. Meier, Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, Halle, Gebauer, 1752, § 462, 
AA 16, p. 828: “A judgment that is signified by means of terms is called a proposition 
(propositio, enunciatio) [Ein Urtheil, welches durch Ausdrücke bezeichnet wird, heisst ein 
Satz (propositio, enunciatio)]”. 
30 On a discovery whereby any new critique of pure reason is to be made superfluous by 
an older one, in I. Kant, Theoretical Philosophy After 1781, ed. by H. Allison, P. Heath, 
trans. by G. Hatfield, M. Friedman, H. Allison, P. Heath, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, AA 8, p. 193-194. 
31 Vienna Logic, in Kant, Lectures on Logic, AA 24, p. 934. 
32 M. N. Forster, “Kant’s Philosophy of Language?”, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 74, 
2012, p. 485-511. 
33 See M. Capozzi, Kant e la logica, vol. I, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 2002 (reprint 2013), p. 
161-162. 
34 Pölitz Logic, AA 24, p. 580.  
35 Ibid., p. 588. 
Kant, Soemmerring and the Importance of the Sense of Hearing 
 35 
Therefore we simply must acknowledge that for Kant thinking needs 
language.36 And this acknowledgment is supported by the connection of 
language with hearing. 
This brings us to point II). I believe that, just as Jürgen Trabant has 
stressed the importance of hearing in Herder’s philosophy of language,37 it 
is time to do the same for Kant.  
According to Kant’s lectures on anthropology dated before 1781, he did 
not hesitate to maintain that for a child hearing is more important than sight: 
The sense an old person can dispense with most, would be hearing, but for children 
it is sight. For hearing is an organ of reason [Organon der Vernunft]; without hearing 
there is no speech, and without speech, no signs of the concepts, and without that no 
use of the understanding. An old person, however, who already has this, can dispense 
with hearing; but the child without sight devises other sensations for itself for 
cognizing objects. Hearing is thus the most important sense [der wichtigste Sinn] in 
the acquisition of cognition, but in regard to use of the world, sight is the most 
important.38 
Kant’s conviction of the essential role of hearing in cognitive processes 
brings him to claim that those who have never heard, and therefore cannot 
reproduce the sounds of articulate speech, are hindered in the use of reason. 
According to his lectures on anthropology of 1782:  
Which one of the two senses, hearing and sight, is the most important and the most 
necessary [wichtigste und nothwendigste]? The sense of hearing because without 
hearing we would not have concepts. It is difficult to teach people that are deaf from 
birth to speak, and they never reach concepts such as those of people capable of 
hearing, although there are educational institutions for deaf-mute people.39  
Again, in lectures dating from 1784-1785 hearing is declared to be “much 
more important” than sight: 
                                                          
36 See M. Capozzi, “Kant on Logic, Language and Thought”, in D. Buzzetti-M. 
Ferriani (eds), Speculative Grammar, Universal Grammar, and Philosophical Analysis of 
Language, Amsterdam-Philadelphia, John Benjamins, 1987, p. 97-147. 
37 J. Trabant, Traditionen Humboldts, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp Taschenbuch 
Wissenschaft, 1990, p. 175 ff. See also Id., “Herder’s Discovery of the Ear”, in K. Mueller-
Vollmer (eds), Herder Today, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1990, p. 345-366. 
38 Anthropology Friedlander, in I. Kant, Lectures on Anthropology, ed. by A. W. Wood 
and R. B. Louden, trans. by R. R. Clewis, R. B. Louden, G. F. Munzel, and A. W. Wood, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, AA 25, p. 498. 
39 Menschenkunde, in Kant, Lectures on Anthropology, AA 25, p. 916. 
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With hearing the object does not have an effect on me immediately, but only 
through the air, and I do not have an effect on it at all. It is the sense that is best 
suited to communicating thoughts, [and is] much more important [weit wichtiger] 
than the sense of sight, for without it we cannot receive any representations or ideas; 
the sense of sight is the most dispensable of all the senses.40 
What makes deafness a worse deprivation than blindness is that, according 
to McCance, for Kant “sign language would be […] mimicry, something 
that cannot be mixed with philosophy’s tongue”.41 Now, in lectures, dating 
from the middle to the late 1780s, Kant mentions a school for the deaf in 
Saxony: 
Language is a necessary and essential part of the use of the understanding. For by 
such signs, I put myself in the condition to distinguish the representations of the 
understanding. The art of teaching people born deaf and mute to speak is recently 
much cultivated and in Saxony there is a teacher who already has taught many. 
Die Sprache ist ein nothwendiges und wesentliches Stuck des Gebrauchs des Verstandes. 
Denn durch solche Zeichen setz ich mich in den Stand die Vorstellungen des Verstandes 
zu unterscheiden. Die Kunst Taub und Stumm gebohrnen sprechen zu lehren ist 
neuerlich sehr cultivirt und man hat in Sachsen einen solchen Lehrer der schon viele 
Unterrichtet hat.42  
The teacher of the school for the deaf in Saxony is Samuel Heinicke (1727-
1790), who did not teach the language of signs but used the oral method.43 
Kant must have appreciated the advantages of this method, which enables 
students to speak and to understand other people by lip reading, but he 
seems doubtful as to the efficacy of making students feel their throats as an 
effective means to obtain general concepts. In his opinion, a person that 
learns to speak by this method: 
                                                          
40 Anthropology Mrongovius, ibid., AA 25, p. 1243. 
41 D. McCance, Medusa’s Ear: University Foundings from Kant to Chora L., New 
York, SUNY Press, 2004, p. 33. 
42 Anthropology Dingelstaedt, AA 25, p. 1560.  
43 See J. Gessinger, Auge und Ohr. Studien zur Erforschung der Sprache am Menschen, 
1700-1850, Berlin-New York, De Gruyter, 1994, p. 273-74, 286-91, 298-331. C. G. 
Schütz mentions Heinicke in a letter to Kant of May 20 1785, AA 10, p. 409; the name of 
Heinicke is mentioned by Kant in Reflexion 1510, AA 15, p. 829 (1780-1784). 
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must convert the sounds, which have been coaxed from him by instruction, into a 
feeling of the movement of his own speech muscles. But he never arrives at real 
concepts in this way, because the signs that he needs are not capable of universality.44 
The texts we have examined provide additional evidence against Forster’s 
thesis because they show that there is not a conversion of Kant to Herder’s 
point of view from 1790, but, at most, an increase of a long lasting interest 
for such matters in his later years. At the same time, this evidence makes us 
wonder why in his comment of Soemmerring’s essay Kant kept silent on 
the importance of hearing, so conspicuous in that essay.  
My suggestion is that Kant did not express what would have certainly 
been his agreement with the theses concerning the primacy of hearing and 
the problem of deafness expressed by Soemmerring and, through 
Sommerring’s quotations, by Heinse, because Soemmerring had connected 
the idea of the brain-water, so central in Kant’s scientific comment, to 
another of Heinses’s novels, indeed his most famous one, Ardinghello 
(1787).45 In this novel Heinse had put forward a theory that water could be 
the common principle of both the cosmos and (in Soemmerring’s words) 
the organ of the soul, and, what is more, had highlighted once again the 
centrality of sound through an etymological connection of the words 
‘water’ and ‘music’.46 We can imagine that this kind of phantasy was not 
acceptable to the author of the Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des 
Himmels who had recently been working again on cosmology taking into 
account new astronomical and chemical data.47  
What is certain is that Kant could find nothing to object to the words 
contained in Sommering’s letter: hearing is the most important sense. 
Indeed he can possibly have used them as a silent new support to his bold 
assertion in his Opus posthumum : “thinking is speaking and this is hearing 
[das Denken ist ein Sprechen und dieses ein Hören]”.48 It is therefore a 
                                                          
44 Anthropology from a Pragmatic point of View, in Kant, Anthropology, History, and 
Education, AA 7, p. 159. 
45 W. Heinse, Ardinghello und die glückseligen Inseln (1787), ed. by M. L. Baeumer, 
Stuttgart, Reclam, 1975. 
46 See Stollberg, Ohr und Auge, p. 100. 
47 See M. Capozzi, “La sfera infinita dell'universo nella Naturgeschichte di Kant”, in P. 
Totaro-L. Valente (eds), Sphaera. Forma, immagine e metafora tra medioevo ed età moderna, 
Firenze, Olschki & CNR Edizioni, 2012, p. 363-410. 
48 I. Kant, Opus postumum, trans. by E. Förster and M. Rose, ed. by E. Förster, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, AA 21, p. 103. See M. Capozzi, “Pensare, 
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plausible hypothesis that, if we have to find a source for Kant’s late 
reinforcement of his conviction of the necessity of a bond between 
thought, language and hearing, this source, so far ignored, could be 
Soemmerring. 
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